Sustained Chinese naval deployments and gray-zone operations around Taiwan, including a late-October 2026 carrier strike group transit involving over 50 vessels from multiple theater commands, have reinforced trader views that Beijing continues to favor incremental pressure over imminent full-scale invasion. Taiwan officials described the activity as an obvious regional threat, yet Beijing framed the Liaoning group’s movements as routine annual training unrelated to any specific contingency. Parallel missile drills, cognitive warfare around historical anniversaries, and reported influence efforts ahead of Taiwan’s November local elections have kept tensions elevated without triggering the diplomatic or military thresholds that would signal an attack by end-2027. U.S.-Japan joint exercises and Taiwanese vigilance have further underscored deterrence dynamics. While internal CCP leadership consolidation and capability development continue, the absence of mobilization indicators or acute crises supports the current 90.5% implied probability that no invasion occurs within the resolution window, though sudden escalation from miscalculation or major policy shift remains a low-probability tail risk.